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25TH ANNIVERSARY COMMEMORATION
THE GULF OF MAINE MARITIME BOUNDARY
DELIMITATION: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
CHAMBER
Judge Stephen M. Schwebel*

Judgment in the Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Gulf of Maine Case) was rendered
not by the plenary International Court of Justice (ICJ) but, pursuant to
Article 26 of its founding statute, by “a chamber for dealing with a
particular case.”1 Provision for that type of Chamber was not found in
the statute of the Court’s predecessor, the Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ).2 One of the few changes in the Permanent
Court’s statute made in 1945 when the Statute of the International Court
of Justice was adopted as an annex to the United Nations Charter was to
add a provision for such particular, ad hoc Chambers.3 A significant
subtraction was made in 1945 as well. The PCIJ statute provided, in
respect of the composition of standing, subject-matter Chambers, that the
provision of Article 9, requiring that “the whole body also should
represent the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems
of the world,” applied to ad hoc Chambers as well.4 While Article 9
appears in the same terms in the PCIJ and ICJ statutes,5 that Chamber
application does not appear in the Statute of the International Court of
Justice,6 a deletion which played a significant part in the composition of
* Former judge of the International Court of Justice and President of the Court from
1997-2000. Presently acting as an independent arbitrator and counsel in Washington,
DC, and as a door tenant of Essex Court Chambers in London.
1. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 26, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 3
Bevans 1153 [hereinafter ICJ Statute art. 26].
2. See Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Dec. 16, 1920, 6
L.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter PCIJ Statute].
3. See ICJ Statute, supra note 1; PCIJ Statute, supra note 2.
4. See PCIJ Statute, supra note 2, art. 26.
5. See PCIJ Statute, supra note 2, art. 9; ICJ Statute, supra note 1, art. 9.
6. See ICJ Statute, supra note 1.
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the Gulf of Maine Case Chamber. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice provides that: “The Court may at any
time form a chamber for dealing with a particular case. The number of
judges to constitute such a chamber shall be determined by the Court
with the approval of the parties.”7
While nowadays the International Court of Justice has a heavy
docket and deals with a substantial number of cases, that was not true for
the decades of the 1960s and 1970s. That fact led to consideration by the
United Nations General Assembly of ways to promote recourse to the
Court. The Secretary-General was charged with preparing a report,
based on a questionnaire sent to States’ Members. Among the answers
to the questionnaire was that of Sweden, doubtless prepared by the then
Legal Adviser of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, Dr. Hans Blix. Sweden
wrote:
No State has ever made use of the possibility of having a dispute
adjudicated on by . . . a special chamber as provided for in
Article 26 of the Statute . . . . In determining the number of
judges constituting the chamber, the Court shall have the
approval of the parties. On the other hand, the parties are
without any influence when it comes to the election of the
individual judges of such a chamber . . . . The Swedish
Government believes that the procedure envisaged in . . . Article
26 of the Statute would prove more attractive to potential
litigants if the Rules of Court were modified to the effect that
also the election of the individual members of a chamber should
be based on a consensus between the Court and the parties. In
this way the parties will have the opportunity of submitting their
case to a chamber of their choice . . . .8
The United Kingdom made a like suggestion.9 So did leading court
authorities, including Judge Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, Judge Sture
Petrén, and former Registrar and later U.N. General Assembly President
Edvard Hambro.10
The Court set about responsively revising its rules. Consequently,
Article 17 of the Rules of Court as revised provides that, when the parties
7. ICJ Statute, supra note 1, at para. 2.
8. Stephen M. Schwebel, Chambers of the International Court of Justice Formed for
Particular Cases, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN HONOR
OF SHABTAI ROSENNE 93 (Y. Dinstein & M. Tabory eds., 1989), reproduced in STEPHEN
M. SCHWEBEL, JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (Cambridge University Press 1994).
9. Id. at 101.
10. Id. at 104-06.
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to a case have agreed to the formation of a Chamber, “the President shall
ascertain their views regarding the composition of the chamber and shall
report to the Court accordingly.”11 It was assumed that the Court would
give weight to the views of the parties in electing the members of the
Chamber.
The Court has not published records of the deliberations of its Rules
Committee or of the full Court on the revision of its rules. Thus it is not
known how contentious adoption of the revision of Article 17 of the rules
was. Knowledgeable secondary sources indicate that the Court was
divided.12 In any event, the U.N. General Assembly in 1974 adopted a
resolution endorsing the Court’s revision of its rules “allowing for
greater influence of the parties on the composition of ad hoc chambers . .
. .”13
In 1979, in light of this history, the United States and Canada
concluded a treaty and a special agreement providing for submission to a
Chamber of the Court the course of the maritime boundary that divides
their continental shelf and fisheries zone in the Gulf of Maine area.14 In
preparing these agreements, representatives of the United States and
Canada consulted with the then President of the Court, Sir Humphrey
Waldock.15 The parties agreed on the names of the members of the
Chamber to be elected by the Court. Sir Humphrey was to be President
of the Chamber.16 Among its members was to have been Professor Max
Sorensen, who was not a Member of the Court. However, President
Waldock and Professor Sorensen died before the Chamber was
established, as did Judge Richard R. Baxter and Judge Abdullah El Erian.
Had the Chamber been constituted as originally contemplated, it is
highly probable that its establishment would have been less
controversial. But that was not to be.
The parties revised their agreements to take account of these deaths
and agreed upon the new names of the members of the proposed
Chamber. Not only did they name names, but they provided that, if the
Court failed to elect the specified members of the Chamber, the case
11. Id. at 102 (quoting International Court of Justice Rules of Court art. 17 (1978)
(amended 2005)).
12. See Schwebel, supra note 8, at 103-07.
13. Id. at 106 (quoting G.A. Res. 3232 (XXIX), para. 6, U.N. Doc. A/9846 (Nov. 12,
1974)).
14. Memorial of the United States of America, Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (U.S. v. Can.), 1982 I.C.J. Special Agreement 1-28
(Nov. 25, 1981).
15. See id.
16. See id.
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would be withdrawn from the Court and remitted to arbitration. They
prepared an arbitration agreement to meet that contingency and provided
the Court with a copy.17 They also proposed that one of those so named,
Judge André Gros, should be the President of the Chamber.18 They
further specified that the Chamber had to be established during the
current term of the Court, since Judge Gros’ tenure was shortly to
expire.19
When presented with these revised agreements, the Court found
itself profoundly divided. There were those who were desirous not only
that the Court, which then was dealing with only one active case, take on
a very major case and one on a subject of the Court’s particular
experience. They also favored recourse to ad hoc Chambers as a way to
promote increased recourse to the Court. They feared that if the Court
turned down the creation of a Chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case, the
first occasion when establishment of an ad hoc Chamber was proposed,
that promising possibility would be indefinitely aborted.
But the opposition was intense. At its core were judges from
countries which never accepted the jurisdiction of the Court and who
expected themselves never to be named to an ad hoc Chamber. They
spoke in terms of an assault on the universality of the Court. They and
other Members of the Court argued that affording the parties to a case a
voice in the composition of a Chamber was inconsistent with the statute,
which provided for consulting the parties on the number of members of a
Chamber but not its composition. They contended that permitting the
parties to determine the composition of a Chamber would be consonant
with arbitration but not with the character of the Court as a court.
But there was more to the opposition than this. While President
Waldock was to have been president of the Chamber, the Acting
President of the Court was not named to be even a member of this newly
composed Chamber. A judge of the Court who was especially expert in
the law of the sea was not included. And the judge who was proposed as
President of the Chamber was unpopular with a number of his
colleagues.
The result was that, for some weeks, the Court was at an impasse. A
majority one way or the other could not be mustered for the
establishment of the Chamber. One influential judge was absent during
17. Memorial of the United States of America, Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (U.S. v. Can.), 1982 I.C.J. Pleadings 2, 6 (Nov. 20
& 25, 1981).
18. See id.
19. See id. at 2.
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those weeks because of his wife’s mortal illness. Finally he was able to
return to The Hague, and he joined those favoring establishment of the
Chamber. Once a majority for so doing was apparent, other judges
joined it, and the requisite order, in the end, was adopted by a large
majority of the Court.
And so the Chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case was established.
Departing from the explicit preference of the parties, it chose to elect not
Judge Gros but Judge Ago as its President. In due course, after written
pleadings and oral hearings of notable quality, the Chamber rendered
judgment.
Other ad hoc Chambers were to follow, and their establishment was
uncontroversial. But genuine issues of the conformity of the revised
Rules of Court with the terms and import of the Court’s statute remained.
They were searchingly examined in depth in an acute dissent in 1990 by
Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen in the Case Concerning the Land, Island
and Maritime Frontier Dispute.20 Judge Shahabuddeen maintained that
the drafters of the PCIJ statute had designedly excluded the views of the
parties to a case in the composition of a Chamber because admitting
those views would entrench an arbitral rather than judicial model.21 He
found Article 17 of the Rules of Court as revised inconsistent with that
original intent.22
For my part, I remain of the view that Article 17 of the Rules of
Court is consistent with the statute as revised in 1945 and that the ability
of the Court to constitute a Chamber pursuant to it is a constructive
option. But I recognize that there is room for more than one view.

20. See Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), 1990 I.C.J. 18
(Feb. 28), (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting).
21. See id.
22. See id.

